The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a ship reporting system based on messages broadcast by vessels carrying an AIS transponder. The recent increase of terrestrial networks and satellite constellations of receivers is making AIS one of the main sources of information for Maritime Situational Awareness activities. Nevertheless, AIS is subject to reliability and manipulation issues; indeed, the received reports can be unintentionally incorrect, jammed or deliberately spoofed. Moreover, the system can be switched off to cover illicit operations, causing the interruption of AIS reception. This paper addresses the problem of detecting whether a shortage of AIS messages represents an alerting situation or not, by exploiting the Received Signal Strength Indicator available at the AIS Base Stations (BS). In designing such an anomaly detector, the electromagnetic propagation conditions that characterize the channel between ship AIS transponders and BS have to be taken into consideration. The first part of this work is thus focused on the experimental investigation and characterisation of coverage patterns extracted from the real historical AIS data. In addition, the paper proposes an anomaly detection algorithm to identify intentional AIS on-off switching. The presented methodology is then illustrated and assessed on a real-world dataset.
A novel anomaly detection approach to identify intentional AIS on-off switching 
Introduction
The maritime domain can be considered essential to the world's economy as over 90% of global trade is carried by sea. It actually represents the most effective way to move goods around the world. Moreover, maritime environment also involves the transportation of human beings, with more than 400 million passengers embarking and disembarking in European ports every year ( European Commission, 2009 ). As some vessels may be engaged in illegal, illicit or dangerous activities, maritime transport and port security has become a major concern. One of the main pillars of maritime safety and security is Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) -the capability of understanding events, circumstances and activities within and impacting the maritime environment-which is aided by surveillance and tracking systems. * Corresponding author. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology, a ship reporting system originally designed for collision avoidance, is becoming a cornerstone of MSA. Ships of 300 gross tons and upwards in international voyages, 500 tons and upwards for cargoes not in international waters and passenger vessels are obliged to be fitted with AIS equipment ( SOLAS, 20 0 0 ). In addition, all the EU fishing vessels of overall length exceeding 15 m are also required to be fitted with AIS from May 2014 ( European Parliament, 2002 ) . Differently than other operational coastal active systems for maritime surveillance, AIS is characterized by considerable coverage (VHF propagation) together with a relatively accurate positioning performance ( Angrisano, Gaglione, & Gioia, 2013 ) . Moreover, the continuous increase of terrestrial networks and satellite constellation of receivers is providing global tracking data well-suited to be used in a wide range of applications beyond collision avoidance. Example applications include vessel tracking ( Mazzarella et al., 2013; Mazzarella, Arguedas, & Vespe, 2015; Pallotta, Horn, Braca, & Bryan, 2014 ) detection on vessel movements ( Handayani, Sediono, & Shah, 2013; Laxhammar, Falkman, & Sviestins, 2009; Ristic, La Scala, Morelande, & Gordon, 2008 ) .
Given that the AIS is a self-reporting system, the main drawbacks of this technology are its reliability and susceptibility to manipulation. Therefore, the verification of the trustworthiness of AIS data is becoming a key problem to exploit the full potential of this technology not only for safety but for security applications as well. In this context, the main issues to be addressed are the following ( Balduzzi, Pasta, & Wilhoit, 2014; Harati-Mokhtari, Wall, Brooks, & Wang, 2007 ) : (i) AIS messages can be erroneous, because a part of the information is entered manually by the crew, both at the initialisation of the system for permanent data (e.g. the name of the vessel) and at every new journey for journey-related data (e.g. the vessel destination); (ii) AIS reports can be falsified (or spoofed ) as a deceptive behaviour; (iii) a vessel can turn off its AIS transponder potentially to engage in illegal activities. The study in Iphar, Napoli, and Ray (2015) aims at pointing out the vessels for which AIS information are false or falsified, by using a methodology based on integrity and quality assessment of the AIS messages. Detection of AIS position spoofing has been studied in Papi et al. (2015) , where the authors combine a classic radio-location method based on Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) with an Extended Kalman Filter designed to track vessels in geodetic coordinates. The authors in Katsilieris, Braca, and Coraluppi (2013) address instead the inference problem of whether the received AIS data are trustworthy with the help of radar measurements. Up to the authors' knowledge, the work by Guerriero, Coraluppi, Carthel, and Willett (2010) is the only one in literature addressing the detection of the AIS status (on/off). In particular, the AIS intermittency has been there analysed using the mathematical formalism of Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and the characteristics of the AIS transmission channel have been taken into consideration. This paper is devoted to the analysis of AIS data for the purpose of detecting whether the absence of AIS measurements is representative of an anomalous event (e.g. intentional on-off switching), or it can be ascribed to a channel communication dropout . The emission termination detection, as already described in Guerriero et al. (2010) is a challenging problem due to the high level of fluctuations in the AIS signal, meaning that the probability of receiving a transmitted AIS message can undergo significant variations.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. The focus of the first part is on a comprehensive experimental investigation of open sea radio wave propagation of the AIS messages, deepening the preliminary study in Mazzarella, Vespe, Tarchi, Aulicino, and Vollero (2016) . Such an analysis is based on the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), a feature available at receivers, and rarely exploited in the wide range of applications in the maritime domain. This study, that at our knowledge is not available in literature for this kind of systems, is essential to build the sound models suitable to be used within the proposed architecture aimed at detecting suspicious lack of AIS messages. Second, we propose a general approach for the detection of anomalous AIS dropouts. The main work in literature dealing with the AIS messages dropouts detection is the one in Guerriero et al. (2010) , where only the AIS reports presence/absence information is taken into account. The architecture proposed in this paper exploits an additional feature, the RSSI, in order to improve the detection capabilities. In addition, the detector can be operated both in off-line and on-line scenarios. Many surveillance applications present indeed a strong limitation because they are based on the assumption that anomaly classification is performed after the whole trajectory has been observed and this delays the detection of alerting events.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview of the proposed methodology and emphasize the need of a thorough analysis of the AIS coverage patterns. The characterisation of the AIS reception behaviour is developed in Section 3 . In Section 4 the anomaly detection algorithm is discussed, together with the analysis of features used for the experimentation. The proposed algorithm is applied to real-word data and the performance is evaluated in Section 5 , while conclusions are reported in Section 6 .
Methodology
While analysing the AIS records, the events of interest, as described in Guerriero et al. (2010) , are the reception of new messages and the dropout , namely the loss of AIS messages. In particular, a dropout can occur whenever the AIS transponder correctly broadcasts the message, but it is not received by the BS because of the communication channel-related effects (vessel range out of Line-Of-Sight (LOS), fading, multipath, shadowing). Nevertheless, a dropout can be the effect of an intentional transmission termination to cover illicit activities. The main goal of this paper is the automatic discrimination between channel-related dropouts and intentional ones. The detection of such events is challenging mainly for two reasons. First of all, because of the irregular nature of AIS data whose reporting interval changes from few seconds to several minutes. Second, the radio wave propagation phenomena for an open and congested environment like the sea are very structured and greatly affect the behaviour of the RSSI at the BS. The flowchart of the proposed methodology is summarized in Fig. 1 for a single receiving BS.
Anomaly detectors generally compare test events against prebuilt normality models, in order to classify them as anomalous or regular. The core of the architecture is thus represented by two normality models, as highlighted in Fig. 1 by the two yellow rectangles. On the one side, the historical AIS data received by a single BS in a certain time interval are used as a training data set to build a data-driven normality model for the BS. As it will be discussed throughout the paper, this can be achieved by exploiting the RSSI, the vessel positions and their corresponding distances from the BS as model features, and standard tools from machine learning. On the other side, the single vessel normality model is based on the theoretical aspects affecting the electromagnetic propagation between the BS and the vessel antenna. These phenomena are strictly dependent on vessel-related features, like the height of the transmitting antenna.
From an operational point of view, let's pretend to gather a test vessel track, that is generally the output of a tracking system. By following the workflow in Fig. 1 , the test track is periodically analysed to look for potential dropouts. If an AIS message dropout occurs at a certain time t d , the following steps take place. First, features have to be extracted from the vessel track in order to make a comparison to the normality models. Accordingly, an estimation (or a prediction) of the vessel position at the dropout time t d can be obtained from the tracking system and, consequently, an estimation of the distance between the BS and the expected vessel position is available. The reconstruction of the RSSI missing value is obtained, instead, through the imputation step in Fig. 1 . Although missing data is not a well-studied area in the maritime domain, many missing data imputation methods have been developed outside of the maritime domain research area, including Nearest Neighbors imputation (NN) ( Jiahua Chen, 2001; Rancourt, 1999 ) , Bayesian-based imputation ( Hruschka, Hruschka, & Ebecken, 2007 ) , and regression-based imputation ( Fox, 2008 ) . Once the missing message has been reconstructed, it can be compared to the normality models in order to obtain two scores, one from the BS normality model and the other one from the single vessel model, revealing the likelihoods of the imputed message over the normality models. A joint statistics obtained by combining the single likelihoods will be compared to a threshold in order to flag
